Justice and defense in communities

Main article: Community

Thoughts on justice

It is not a happy thought but there is and will be criminal behavior in all societies. Our idea is that the ratings system will temper this to a large extent since it wouldn’t be possible to “get away” with alot of bad behavior. This is especially true for white-collar crime. The criminal would be exposed to more than just a supportive friend-group. It is also the case that people with a tendency toward bad behavior might be more easily identified early-on through the ratings system so proper interventions can be designed. It is notorious that horrific acts are performed by seemingly normal people with no prior record. Most ordinary criminals, however, often have a long rap sheet, meaning that action could probably have been taken much earlier in their career to change their course.

Since we expect a robust deterrent capability from the ratings system itself, what exactly would it be able to do? A few ideas come to mind:

• Rate someone directly on their danger to society.
• Allow probabilistic assessments of danger from other ratings. For instance, if someone is rated as anti-social and having anger management difficulties, we might be able to correlate that with a tendency toward violence.
• Provide a historical tracking of people in order to collect data on when and how things go wrong.
• Provide alerts to the individual being rated and to psychologists/counselors who might be able to help before things get out of hand. We would expect mental health professionals to scan for difficult people flagged by the ratings system. The police could also be given this feedback.

Although our hope is that the ratings system by itself reduces crime, we will still no doubt face serious criminal behavior. This gives rise to a police force and, more broadly, a system of justice (courts). We presume a community governance structure that passes laws based on some voting process with penalties associated with breaking those laws. The community would then agree on a mechanism of law enforcement and administration of justice. Here we will consider both of these functions separately.

How would a police force work under the guise of a voluntary community rating system? We would expect a community to take seriously the personnel and methods used by its law enforcement personnel. We would expect a police force to be primarily concerned with public safety and deterrence (as opposed to getting people in trouble). Needless to say, the police force will be responsive to community opinion throughout the ratings system.

Ratings can help communities do a better job selecting police officer candidates. Police work is not generally well-paid today, but our system wouldn’t have this issue given a society with an equitable distribution of wealth. So the field will be able to attract from a wider pool of applicants. The applicants will have been rated throughout their lives, presumably, for the qualities that make a good officer: fairness, good decision making, ability to perform under stress, etc. Communities may particularly value an officer’s ability to use non-violent means of conflict resolution and de-escalation. In any event, communities will be able to vet and finalize decisions on who is selected for the job.

Specific law enforcement techniques will vary and will depend on community consensus. One advantage of the ratings system is that police methods can be constantly scrutinized and judged. In our present society, it seems that police have too much latitude in this regard and a consequent tendency toward needless violence. The current justification for police violence is self-protection, but an involved community should be able to establish this trade-off. If it favors non-violence by police, it can state openly that officers will take more personal risk in the name violence prevention. On the other hand a community trying to control high amounts of violence might favor police self-protection and allow its members to engage with criminals more freely. A ratings system makes clear the community’s priorities.

Law enforcement will be especially scrutinized, and rated, for corruption. We wouldn’t expect corruption to be a big issue in a system where equitable wealth distribution is the norm. Furthermore, in a moneyless system, corruption would be harder to carry out. But corruption is possible in any society and we would expect ours to deal with it quickly. Communities could choose, for instance, to appoint a separate force to police the police force, rather than having a dubious “internal affairs” office handle it. Communities could also use corruption ratings for the police force as counterweights to any case they bring against an offender. In this way corruption directly affects the chance of successfully prosecuting cases.

We presume here, of course, a judicial system which has the power to ascertain the guilt or innocence of charged individuals. Today, our judicial system functions on a few principles, all of which are challenged by the ratings system:

• The presumption of innocence.
• The right to a trial by jury.
• An adversarial process which has exactly two sides, both working against each other.
• The need for expensive legal representation.

The ratings system works to mitigate the weakest aspects of each of these. The presumption of innocence may seem like a benevolent feature of our justice system and, as a principle, is one we could certainly keep under our improved system. However, today, it is rarely the case that a trial begins and the suspect has not been already informally judged in some manner or another. This is especially difficult for the poor who are unable to pay for adequate representation. Our ratings system makes this pre-judgement rigorous and subject to community standards.

The trial by jury is another feature of our system that seems reasonable but is, in application, problematic. Juries are selected not for their objective competence in judging a case but for their pliability. Each side, which must agree on the jury members, wants them to be amenable to its ideas. Once a trial begins, the goal is to convince the jury, not establish the objective truth. Juries are composed of average people, not experts in law or the evidence being presented to them. It might be more effective to select jury members using a ratings system rather than through an agreement between two interested parties. People who are interested in jury duty, as part of their contribution to the community, can volunteer to be considered for cases and the community can rate their likely efficacy. This method could form part of the selection process and would go some way toward mitigating the problem of incompetent juries.

Jury trials can be further supplemented by opinions in the ratings system. Trials will be open to the public, just as they are now, and communities will provide opinions on culpability of the accused. Obviously the opinions may be biased, but these could be derated or thrown out if so deemed by other raters. Only opinions rated very highly in objectivity and expertise would be allowed to influence a verdict. The ratings system, just as it is capable of rendering optimized policy decisions, could also render verdicts for trials.

We should note here that most cases in our present system don’t even go to trial. They are settled through a plea bargaining process which is another questionable aspect of our judicial system. This process pits prosecutor against the accused in an attempt to get the accused to admit to some crime lower than the one they were charged with in exchange for a reduced sentence. The prosecutor threatens that a trial could produce an outcome that is easily worse for them (you never know what a jury will do). Needless to say, this is not a system intended to produce the truth. It is designed to process more cases in an overloaded system. One of the disadvantages of trial juries is their time and expense.

Our ratings system should be able to do away with plea bargaining altogether since it is antithetical to the essence of our vision, that is, to produce a social mechanism that yields the truth. But then how would we solve the problem of expensive and time-consuming trials? First, we’d hope the ratings system would minimize involvement with the judicial system in the first place. Second, we’d hope that it would facilitate a speedy trial by itself being a source of impartial information, as discussed above. Third, the ratings system’s focus on process optimization should be able to streamline judicial procedures by reducing self-serving waste and bureaucracy.

The adversarial system we employ today is highly suspect. We make trial decisions by listening to two sides who are completely against each other. There is no third side, a presumably neutral one, which weighs in on the decision. This spectacle is then witnessed by a jury, with no legal experience, and expected to come to an impartial decision. Needless to say, our ratings system can provide a neutral third side in any dispute by harnessing its investigative capabilities, objectivity, and mathematical aggregation capabilities.

One could imagine that our ratings system might even serve to eliminate the trial system altogether. We might envision instead a truth-seeking “panel” that establishes what really happened during the alleged crime and the culpability of those involved. The panel would be aided by the ratings system and would certainly take input from the various interested parties, those who believe in the guilt or innocence of the accused. Such panels would then be rated by the quality of their investigation and conclusions. The community could appoint panel members based on their ability to conduct impartial investigations and come to sound conclusions.

Another downside to our judicial process is the requirement for expensive legal representation. This is, in part, a result of the adversarial process itself. Any process that pits accused vs. accuser as its basic framework for adjudication will motivate representatives to work for either side. But this is only part of the problem. The more disturbing issue is that lawyers have influenced the law and legal procedure so as to make themselves an indispensable part of the process. You may be technically allowed to represent yourself in court but judges tend to frown on it and expect those involved to be versed in the nuances of procedure (document preparation, filing requirements, speaking conventions, etc.)

Lawyers are expensive both because they have increased the demand for their services and limited their supply. They have influenced the passage of requirements such as graduation from approved schools and licensing exams. These may seem reasonable at first glance but they have served to limit the supply and raise the cost of hiring representation. Public defenders are available for those who can’t afford a lawyer in a criminal trial but it is well known that their record of success is poor. The wealthy hire expensive lawyers because it leads to better outcomes. The result, overall, is a justice system that rewards those with money.

An improved justice system would equalize representation, if any were needed at all. Part of this would be achieved with an economic system that redistributes wealth more equitably. And part of it could be achieved with a justice system that treats all participants the same way with respect to rules of procedure. Perhaps facilitators could be assigned to each party so they know what to do. Indeed, the community could even assign “court-appointed lawyers” in every case to eliminate disparities. In a non-adversarial legal system, one with merely an investigative panel for instance, each side would simply “represent” themselves. In any event, a community based rating system will be able to fine-tune the process to yield optimal results. It will be easy to improve on our current system, to say the least.

Thoughts on defense

Another unhappy thought is the need for a defense force. Our system envisions many voluntary communities of diverse ideology, government, economy, and culture. These communities will no doubt interact with each other and might do so violently. There is nothing about a ratings system which inherently prevents war, although we would hope that it does alot to mitigate it by showing that war is non-optimal (usually) and that its citizens usually don’t want it. A ratings-based community should normally give very quick feedback on matters as important as these.

But warlike communities will exist and will attract like-minded violent people. This may be especially true under our voluntary arrangement where people can easily filter themselves into the communities they want. Communities may form along ethnic or religious lines and feel it is their duty to spread their views to others or simply to expand by conquest.

By contrast, free and tolerant communities may view the oppression of neighboring communities as morally unacceptable. It is entirely possible that oppressive communities stop being voluntary associations by preventing its citizens from leaving and joining others. In these cases, the free may feel compelled to act with force to restore them to some base level of freedom and respect for human rights.

Defense forces will thus be necessary for a variety of reasons with the primary one probably being deterrence. Communities will have to decide, through some consensual process, the size and type of force required, how to fund it, and how it will be organized and controlled. Presumably most communities will want tight control over this process since it is easy for defense lobbies to become overly powerful (as in the US) and it is easy for the armed forces to stage a coup d’etat (as in many countries).

A number of issues will arise in most cases:

• What is the purpose of the force? Are there any limitations on its use? A community may prohibit the force from being used in any other context than strict defense against attack. This would mean no expeditionary wars, no unilateral attacks on others, etc.
• Will it be staffed by volunteers, citizen-soldiers, or through an involuntary conscription process (draft)? We would imagine that voluntary communities will want an all-volunteer force. Those who volunteer would, of course, receive a reputational boost for having done so.
• How will the force be equipped? Do we treat it like a business investment? Do we employ a gift-giving or shared central resource pool to equip it? In a moneyless economy, would a special form of money be needed to equip it? Could citizens purchase community “bonds” to fund it? Will taxes be needed? We would note here that one of the original reasons for taxation is war. The income tax in the US was started during the Civil War, WW I made the income tax a large permanent feature of American life, and WW II further increased income taxes.
• What is the process by which the force is used? Is a formal declaration of war required? Is there anyone in the community government that can act quickly to deploy the force in an emergency (ie a commander in chief?)
• Often a separate intelligence agency (or agencies) accompanies a nation’s defense force. Since they operate under cover, the public is usually blind as to their actual operations. Needless to say, these operations are often questionable (undermining other governments, assassination, citizen surveillance). A voluntary community using ratings would have to decide the powers and transparency of its accompanying intelligence service. It is possible that special trusted raters could be appointed to monitor the workings of an intelligence service so it maintains secrecy but still operates within general boundaries set by the community.

Communities may find it necessary to ally themselves with like-minded communities to provide for a common defense. Doing so is often cheaper than going it alone and provides a more effective bulwark against oppressive foreign regimes. This will be especially true if we envision many small communities, each with its own particular interests, economic system, and modes of governance. Communities will thus require a treaty process by which they can form such agreements. Again, this will be done by communities using their normal consensual approach. Since treaties are essentially contracts, there would need to be a rigorous approval process, much as there is in most democracies today. Approval will no doubt depend on access to the ratings system of the other community and 3rd party communities that know the community in question. It is likely that communities will share their ratings by default, but for those that don’t, access will be crucial for informed contract negotiations.

In any society a defense force is dangerous because it can easily usurp democratic government. Our communities will need to be highly attuned to this possibility. Ensuring that defense forces are subservient to community governance will involve appointing officers with impeccable ratings in their adherence to law, democratic traditions of the community, and respect for chains of command placing community government at the pinnacle. Other qualities may include respect for human rights, a deference to diplomacy as a preferred, and default, means of solving disputes, and the view that violence is a last resort. Military leaders will also likely be called upon to help with domestic issues such as disaster relief, civil unrest, infrastructure construction, etc. Military leaders who view their role as multi-faceted, not just as combat strategists, will be sought after by the communities they serve.

War tends to create stronger bonds between the members of a community and imposes obligations on its members that would be otherwise unexpected in a voluntary system. A draft or some other type of sacrifice might be required of its members. War tends to increase the surveillance state’s powers in proportion to its desire to identify spies, traitors, and terrorists. Censoring the mail and eavesdropping on private communications become accepted practices. Even in peacetime, countries with large intelligence services regularly invoke the need for surveillance as a matter of national security. War and the institutions that arise with it are dangerous to civil liberty and the formation of voluntary communities. One supposes that these institutions, like others, will be watched carefully by the communities they serve. But a community that feels threatened, has been through war, or is always poised for it may tend to place too much trust in its security services.

Communities will have the opportunity to gauge their level of threat more objectively through the ratings system. We would hope that national security propaganda and jingoism would be minimized. But national security is often a threat that trumps other considerations and it is unclear how a community would respond.

Given this consideration, communities may wish to construct independent security services that can act in concert when needed but can check each other on matters of domestic interest or when issues are controversial. Breaking them up in this way prevents them from attaining too much concentrated power and curtails their ability to influence society through scare tactics.

The prospect of war raises the question again of geographical contiguity in voluntary communities that may well be dispersed over the world. It is a challenge to be sure and seems analogous to situations where US citizens are stranded abroad in times of crisis. What do we do? We get them out, generally, and employ force to do so if need be. One example of this was the US invasion of Grenada in 1983 which, ostensibly, was to protect American medical students at St. George’s University.

Not all communities will have the resources to defend their citizens in far flung areas. This fact would obviously play a role in the decision of members to live where they do. In a dangerous world it would lead to a tendency for members to move closer together and create their own geographical clusters. Communities might also band together to form a common defense, as noted above.

An extension of this idea would be the formation of a federal government (eg EU, US) to handle issues of common interest, trade between communities, shared natural resources, etc. A ratings system could ensure that the federal structure so created stays true to its original limited role rather than steadily acquiring more power over its member communities. Such a system might arise through an evolution of treaties, much as the EU did, and thus be more resistant to encroachment on national sovereignty. It should be stressed that the US experience with its Articles of Confederation which created a very weak central government, followed by a Constitution, which created a very strong central government, are not the only possibilities.

Although the need for defense is perhaps unavoidable, one would hope that in a world of dispersed (and probably small) voluntary communities, no one community would ever really endanger the citizens of another.